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Abstract
Our goal is to empirically discover how censors react to
the introduction of new proxy servers that can be used
to circumvent their information controls. We examine a
specific case, that of obfuscated Tor bridges, and conduct
experiments designed to discover how long it takes cen-
sors to block them (if they do block at all). Through a
year’s worth of active measurements from China, Iran,
Kazakhstan, and other countries, we learn when bridges
become blocked. In China we found the most interest-
ing behavior, including long and varying delays before
blocking, frequent failures during which blocked bridges
became reachable, and an advancement in blocking tech-
nique midway through the experiment. Throughout, we
observed surprising behavior by censors, not in accor-
dance with what we would have predicted, calling into
question our assumptions and suggesting potential un-
tapped avenues for circumvention.
1 Introduction
Those who censor the Internet face a twofold challenge:
not only do they have to block direct access to content,
but they also must block access to proxy servers and
other indirect means of circumventing their direct blocks.
Because circumventors continually establish new proxy
servers, effective censorship is therefore an ongoing task,
requiring regular attention and upkeep. This aspect of
the censorship problem—just how constrained censors
are by limitations of resources, and how it limits their
effectiveness—is not well understood, though circum-
vention would be improved by better knowledge of cen-
sors’ potential weaknesses. In this research, we seek
to understand the ongoing behavior of censors as it re-
lates to the specific question of the blocking of newly
introduced Tor bridges. We do this through frequent ac-
tive measurements, in multiple countries, that allow us to
∗Authors are listed in alphabetical order.
compute the “lag” between when a bridge is introduced
and when it becomes blocked.
We limit our inquiry to what should be an easy case for
the censor: the “default” bridges built into Tor Browser.
These bridges use a traffic obfuscation protocol, their ad-
dresses are public, fairly static, and easily available to
anyone who downloads the browser. Our usual assump-
tions about censors tell us that these bridges should be
quickly blocked, and yet they remain unblocked almost
everywhere in the world, even in places that are known
to censor Tor. Even the famed Great Firewall of China
(GFW), until recently, was delayed by days or weeks be-
fore blocking new bridges.
We ran measurements probes for a year, testing the
reachability of default Tor bridges every 20 minutes from
the U.S., China, Iran, and Kazakhstan. We recently be-
gan collaboration with established censorship measure-
ment platforms to expand the tests to more countries. We
found blocking of default bridges in China and Kaza-
khstan. In China, our measurements detected a change
in behavior: around October 2016 the censor switched
from blocking bridges only after release (after a delay of
up to 35 days), to blocking bridges preemptively. The
blocking in Kazakhstan is qualitatively different than the
blocking in China, requiring different techniques to de-
tect.
Our results demonstrate that a discrepancy exists be-
tween what we circumvention researchers assume about
censors and what censors do in practice. In this work,
we take only a few small steps toward explaining the dis-
crepancy, performing targeted experiments to learn about
how the censors in China extract bridge addresses from
a software artifact. We hope to call attention to po-
tential blind spots and weaknesses of censors that may
be exploited for more effective circumvention. This is
not a call for circumvention researchers to weaken their
threat models; rather, we hope for richer and more pre-
cise threat models that take into account underappreci-
ated vulnerabilities that may lead to more effective cir-
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cumvention.
2 Related Work
There is not much research aimed at systematically mea-
suring the reactions of censors to the advent of new or
expanded forms of circumvention. We will list the works
we are aware of that most closely resemble our goals and
elaborate by contrast how our goals are different.
Dingledine [2] in 2011 enumerated ways of testing
bridge reachability, among them our primary tool, direct
scans. We attempt to shed light on some of the research
questions he laid out, including knowing what bridges
are blocked and where, and how quickly bridges become
blocked. Dingledine considered the possibility that the
very act of testing the reachability of a bridge could re-
veal the bridge’s existence to an alert censor. This con-
sideration is less acute for us, because we limit ourselves
to testing bridges whose addresses are already known to
the public.
There is prior work on careful distribution strategies
that seek to prevent a censor from discovering many
secret proxy addresses; examples are Proximax [14],
rBridge [24], and Salmon [5]. These limit the rate at
which a censor can enumerate proxies and maintain a
fraction of users whose proxies remain unblocked. We,
on the other hand, start from a different assumption—
that the proxy addresses are already public—and observe
the nature of censors’ actual blocking reactions.
A rich body of research is devoted to innovating new
protocols for disguising traffic, in order to make it harder
to detect and censor. This present work relies on the
properties of a specific protocol, obfs4 [1] (which is dis-
cussed further in Section 3.3). Our purpose, however, is
not directly to advance the state of the art of circumven-
tion practice; but rather to better understand the interac-
tion between censor and circumventor as it exists today.
Khattak et al. [12] showed that understanding censors’
models is beneficial to facilitating evasion. By observ-
ing how the GFW processes certain packets, they were
able to deduce some of the underlying weaknesses of the
GFW and suggest ways to exploit them. Their work is
similar to ours in spirit. While they study ways for a cir-
cumventor to defeat on-line detection, and we study how
censors respond to the actions of circumventors, we have
in common the desire for empirical measurement of ac-
tual censor capabilities,
The Open Observatory of Network Interference
(OONI), a censorship measurement platform, began test-
ing the reachability of Tor bridges [10], both by simple
TCP probes and by attempts to bootstrap a complete Tor
connection. The tests ran in a few specialized test loca-
tions from March 2014 until February 2015, then mostly
lay dormant. The OONI tests did not specifically ex-
amine censors’ treatment of newly introduced bridges.
They revived the test in December 2016 and began to
test the same destinations we were testing. The results
of working with the data of OONI and another measure-
ment platform, ICLab, will appear in Section 5.9.
In 2013, Zhu et al. [26] looked into Chinese mi-
croblogging sites that implement internal censorship in
order to follow the instructions of Chinese government
restrictions; specifically, how long it takes for posts to
be deleted. They discuss methods that detect censorship
events within a few minutes of its occurrence. They dis-
covered that deletions on microblogging sites occurred
most frequently during the initial hour that it was posted,
and 30% occurred in the first 30 minutes. They specu-
late that the censorship system they use contains a list of
keywords that trigger different censorship behavior, and
that if a post is deleted, most repost chains are deleted
within five minutes of the original post’s. Their work is
similar to ours because they, too, are concerned with time
delays. However, they look at microblog deletion while
we look at proxy blocking.
Nobori and Shinjo [15] describe the experience of
deploying a circumvention system, VPN Gate, and the
Great Firewall’s reaction to it, over a period of two
months in 2014. The GFW blocked VPN Gate’s central-
ized directory server only three days after initial deploy-
ment, and just one day later began to automatically har-
vest and block a list of mirror servers. The next day, the
operators of VPN Gate discovered the IP address of the
GFW’s automated scanner and blocked it; in response the
GFW began scanning from multiple locations and cloud
services. VPN Gate began poisoning its list of servers
by mixing in unrelated IP addresses, but after another six
days the GFW began verifying servers as belonging to
VPN Gate before blocking them. During this whole pro-
cess, the GFW suddenly and without explanation ceased
blocking VPN Gate servers for about four days, then re-
sumed again. The lesson of VPN Gate is that the GFW,
at least, is capable of reacting quickly to a new circum-
vention system and build automation to block it.
In 2015, Ensafi et al. [7] did a detailed study on how
the GFW uses active probing to quickly and dynamically
discover a variety of types of proxy server. When the
firewall detected a suspicious connection, it would send
a followup request to the destination address to identify
it. They noted that this type of probing for Tor already
existed in early 2013. The discovery of active probing led
to the development of probing-resistant protocols, obfs4
among them. That a national censor can be so sophisti-
cated in some ways (active probing) and yet seem to lag
in others (blocking of default bridges) is a challenge to
our mental models.
2
3 Background
Tor [4] is an anonymity network that is also used for cen-
sorship circumvention. Tor’s resistance to censorship is
due not to anything inherent in the protocol itself; but to
its surrounding infrastructure of bridges and pluggable
transports. Bridges [3] are secret Tor servers, the ad-
dresses of which are not widely distributed, preventing
easy discovery by a censor. Users are meant to learn
a few bridge addresses through an out-of-band channel,
like email. Pluggable transports [19] are covert commu-
nications protocols that disguise Tor’s traffic signature on
the wire, preventing easy online detection. Bridges that
use a particular pluggable transport, called obfs4, are the
main focus of our study. The properties of obfs4 are cov-
ered in Section 3.3.
Tor Browser [16] is the means by which most ordinary
users access the Tor network, whether for anonymity or
censorship circumvention. It is a modified version of
Firefox with a built-in Tor client and a special interface
for the configuration of bridges and pluggable transports.
Separate from the infrastructure of secret bridges,
Tor Browser also ships with a number of built-in, de-
fault bridges, whose addresses are baked into the source
code [21]. There is a configuration file inside the Tor
Browser listing all these default bridges. Users can use a
default bridge simply by selecting a pluggable transport
from a menu, no out-of-band communication required.
Strictly speaking, a “default bridge” is a contradiction:
bridges are supposed to be secret, not easily discoverable
in a configuration file. Our intuition and the common
assumptions in censorship research tell us that the de-
fault bridges, which are trivially discoverable, should be
quickly blocked—and yet they are not. Indeed, a study
by Matic et. al [13] found that over 90% of bridge users
use one of the default bridges. Even the uncommonly
capable Great Firewall of China, before October 2016,
delayed for days or weeks before blocking these bridges,
in contrast to the rapidity with which it blocks other,
harder-to-detect proxies. The speed with which censors
block default Tor Browser bridges is the main object of
our study.
Besides Tor Browser, there is also an Android version
of Tor called Orbot. Orbot and Tor Browser have most
of their default bridges in common, but a few appear in
Orbot only. We will be looking at these set of different
bridges as well.
3.1 Tor Browser releases
Tor Browser releases changes in two different tracks: sta-
ble and alpha. The stable track is “safe” so to speak, with
only small changes at any given time. For the most part,
stable releases include bug fixes. On the other hand, the
alpha track is much more experimental. It contains ex-
perimental features that are in “test” until it matures and
can be merged with the stable track. Stable and alpha re-
leases tend to appear around the same time since both of
them are driven by Firefox releases. If a Tor Browser ver-
sion number contains the letter ‘a’, it is an alpha version
(for example, 6.5a3). Upon a new Firefox release, Tor
Browser, too, updates any security flaws that may have
been discovered. Each release is an opportunity for Tor
Browser to release new bridges. During our study over
a duration of approximately 12 months, we observed a
total of 18 stable releases and 13 alpha releases [20].
3.2 The lifecycle of a new bridge
In the following sections, we elaborate on the lifecycle
of a new bridge and the stages involved in releasing it.
Each stage in the lifecycle is also a potential opportunity
for censors to detect the addition of a new bridge.
1. Ticket Filed: Filing a ticket in Tor’s online
bug tracker proposes the inclusion of new default
bridges. Censors may monitor the bug tracker and
discover the new default bridges here.
2. Ticket Merged: Bridges are added to the Tor
Browser’s source code during the merging of a
ticket. It is automatically included in nightly builds,
and code containing the new bridge is available in
executable form. Censors may learn of bridges at
this stage if they are looking at the source code
repository or monitoring nightly builds.
3. Testing Release: Preceding a public release, Tor
Browser developers prepare candidate packages and
send them out to the quality assurance mailing list
for testing. Censors monitoring the mailing list
could discover new bridges at this point.
4. Public Release: After bridges have been tested, the
new packages are announced on the Tor Blog. The
Tor Blog is publicly available, and any censors mon-
itoring it would discover the new bridges here. In-
stalled Tor Browsers will automatically update to
include the new packages, and users will begin to
actively use the new bridges. A censor could also
discover the new bridges through black-box testing
an auto-updating installing at this stage.
The entirety of the lifecycle usually takes a few weeks
to complete. Occasionally, if the fix is small enough, the
Testing Release stage is skipped. There is also a possibil-
ity that new bridges are discussed in private mailing lists
beforehand, and a censor that had infiltrated the mail-
ing lists could conceivably discover new bridges before
a ticket had even been filed.
3
3.3 The Properties of obfs4
In our studies, we focus primarily on a particular plug-
gable transport: obfs4, an advanced transport protocol
that offers resistance to deep packet inspection and resis-
tance to active probing.
• Deep Packet Inspection Re-encrypts a Tor stream
so that it appears as a stream of random bytes that
cannot be easily decrypted.
• Active Probing Attacks Censors scan suspected
proxies in order to discover what protocols are sup-
ported. The Great Firewall is known to use active
proving against predecessor protocols obfs2 and
obfs3. However, this attack does not work with
obfs4. Every obfs4 bridge has a per-bridge secret
in which a client must prove knowledge of upon the
initial message. The censor would have to shave the
same out-of-band information as a legitimate client,
therefore rendering the knowledge of a bridge IP ad-
dress insufficient to prove the existence of a bridge.
These security features are crucial because they allow
us to limit the methods of bridge discovery. They give
us the confidence that censors discover our bridges in the
ways that we intend them to.
obfs4 is an important bridge not only for its unique
properties, but also for its applications in the real world:
it is the most commonly used bridge, yielding about
35,000 concurrent users in February 2017 [22].
4 Methodology
Our experiment requires us to be able to detect the mo-
ment a bridge is blocked: when the bridge transitions
from being reachable to being unreachable. We do this
primarily through active measurements from probe sites
located in various countries.
For a little more than a year, we ran frequent TCP
reachability tests of a variety of destinations from probe
sites in the U.S., China, Iran, and Kazakhstan. Because
of the difficulty of acquiring test machines inside coun-
tries subject to information controls, probe coverage is
not continuous or complete in any country other than the
U.S. The probe site in the U.S. acted as a control, allow-
ing us to distinguish occurrences of blocking from tem-
porary bridge outages. Figure 1 shows the time periods
for which we have measurements in each country. From
each probe site, we attempted a TCP connection to every
destination every 20 minutes, recording for each connec-
tion attempt whether the connection was successful, the
time elapsed, and error message if any. The rate of prob-
ing enables us to know not only the date, but also the
time of day, when each bridge became blocked. The set
nickname : ports
New Tor Browser default obfs4 bridges
ndnop3 : 24215, 10527
ndnop5 : 13764
riemann : 443
noether : 443
Mosaddegh : 41835, 80, 443, 2934, 9332, 15937
MaBishomarim : 49868, 80, 443, 2413, 7920, 16488
GreenBelt : 60873, 80, 443, 5881, 7013, 12166
JonbesheSabz : 80, 1894, 4148, 4304
Azadi : 443, 4319, 6041, 16815
Lisbeth : 443
NX01 : 443
LeifEricson : 50000, 50001, 50002
Already existing Tor Browser default bridges
LeifEricson : 41213
fdctorbridge01 : 80
Orbot-only default obfs4 bridges
Mosaddegh : 1984
MaBishomarim : 1984
JonbesheSabz : 1984
Azadi : 1984
Never-published obfs4 bridges
ndnop4 : 27668
Table 1: The destinations we tested, consisting mostly
of new obfs4 bridges, along with some old or never-
published bridges. A bridge is identified by its “nick-
name,” an arbitrary label chosen by its operator. Each
nickname represents an IP address. Multiple ports on the
same IP address count as distinct bridges for our pur-
poses. We also tested port 22 (SSH) on the bridges that
had it open.
of destinations, a mix of fresh default obfs4 bridges and
other bridges, appears in Table 1.
During the latter part of our measurements, we got as-
sistance from the established censorship measurements
platforms OONI and ICLab. Razaghpanah et al. [17] de-
scribe both platforms, their similarities and different de-
sign tradeoffs. At our request, both platforms added to
their repertoire of measurements active measurement of
default Tor Browser bridges. Compared to our custom
reachability tests, the ICLab and OONI measurements
trade frequency for coverage: they run daily, rather than
every 20 minutes, but they cover many more geographic
locations, giving a more global view of censorship. Our
OONI-derived data covers 117 ASes in 55 countries and
our ICLab-derived data covers 201 ASes in 217 coun-
tries. (The actual division is by two-letter country code,
of which there are more than there are countries in the
world. ICLab heavily relies on measurements from VPN
endpoints, including some in autonomous systems that
span more than one country.)
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U.S.
China 1
China 2
Iran
Kazakhstan
Jan
2016
Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan
2017
Feb
High-frequency probes (every 20 minutes, few probe sites)
OONI
ICLab
Jan
2016
Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan
2017
Feb
Measurement platform probes (approximately daily, many probe sites)
Figure 1: Time coverage of our active measurements of bridge reachability. In the upper portion of the figure, “High-
frequency probes,” each box represents one autonomous system and each row is a distinct IP address. We had four
probe sites in the “China 1” autonomous partially overlapping in time, which we spliced together into one series. The
measurement platforms OONI and ICLab, in the lower portion of the figure, cover many more countries but run less
frequently.
Simple TCP reachability testing has limitations, in that
a censor may make a bridge effectively useless, with-
out directly blocking its IP address or TCP port. China
blocks at the TCP/IP layer, so block are easy to detect.
On the other hand, we found that Kazakhstan blocks at a
higher layer. A successful TCP connection doesn’t nec-
essarily mean a successful Tor connection. For this rea-
son, for a limited time we also did testing of full Tor-
over-obfs4 connections. Details of this experiment ap-
pear in Section 6.
Throughout the measurements, we coordinated with
the developers of Tor Browser to begin measurement of
bridges before their introduction. During the course of
the study, the Tor Project was ramping up its obfs4 capac-
ity by adding additional bridges. We additionally ran cer-
tain controlled experiments designed to uncover specific
blocking behaviors of the censor. These included chang-
ing ports on the same address, and inserting a bridge so
that it is available in the same code but commented out.
5 Results and Observations
In this section we present and interpret the results of our
experiments, focusing on China, where we had the most
measurements and saw the most varied behavior. Our
observations in the “China 1” and “China 2” ASes were
mostly in agreement; minor differences are mentioned
in Sections 5.8 and 5.5. In Iran, we did not see any
blocking of bridges; all of them were reachable all the
time—though what we discovered in Kazakhstan means
that there may have been blocking that TCP reachability
tests would not detect. We found blocking of the default
bridges in Kazakhstan, though of a qualitatively different
nature than that which we observed in China. We cover
the particulars of Kazakhstan in Section 6. Throughout
this section, refer to Figure 2 and Table 2, which depict
the entirety of the combined “China 1” data set.
Overall, we recorded over 5.9 million individual probe
results. Our high-frequency probes account for 4.9 mil-
lion of these; ICLab accounts for about 800,000 and
OONI for about 260,000. There are 2.1 million probe
results in the “China 1” AS alone, which is the basis for
Figure 2.
We have organized Tor Browser releases into
“batches”, where each batch contains a distinct set of
fresh bridges. Figure 2 and Table 2 are arranged by
release batch. During the first part of our experiment,
blocking events were distinct: when a batch contained
more than one bridge, all were blocked at once (within
our probing period of 20 minutes). In our first six
batches, we observed blocking delays of 7, 2, 18, 10,
35, and 6 days after the first public release, and up to
57 days after the filing of the first ticket, when bridges
were potentially first discoverable. The only exception
to this was that in the 6.0.5/6.5a3 batch, the censor actu-
ally failed to blocked two bridges, and these two bridges
were blocked only much later. This fact suggests, to us,
that new default bridges are loaded into the firewall in
groups, and are not, for example, detected and blocked
one at a time. During the first six batches, we found that
blocking in China was keyed on both IP address and port,
consistent with an observation of Winter and Lindskog in
2012 [25]. For example, many of the bridges happened
to have port 22 (SSH) open, and it remained accessible
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Figure 2: Timeline of Tor Browser default bridge reachability in the “China 1” AS. Black vertical lines (dashed and
solid) indicate releases. There is a gap in the data between August 9 and August 30, 2016. Before October 2016,
bridges were blocked only after a release; after that they began to be blocked as soon as their ticket was merged.
The vertical yellow stripes indicate where observations from different sites were spliced together. The notation
“// NX01:443” indicates that the bridge was commented out in this release, and uncommented in the following re-
lease.
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Tor Browser 5.0.5/5.0.6/5.5a5: 1 new bridge
03 Dec −19 days Ticket filed ndnop3:24215
09 Dec −13 days Ticket merged ndnop3:24215
12 Dec −9 days Testing release 5.0.5 stable
14 Dec −8 days Testing release 5.5a5 alpha
15 Dec −7 days Public release 5.0.5 stable
17 Dec −5 days Public release 5.0.6 stable
18 Dec −4 days Public release 5.5a5 alpha
22 Dec 0 Blocked ndnop3:24215
Tor Browser 5.0.7/5.5a6: no new bridges
Tor Browser 5.5/6.0a1: 6 new bridges
16 Jan −13 days Ticket filed riemann:443
18 Jan −10 days Ticket merged riemann:443
18 Jan −10 days Ticket filed ndnop3:10527, ndnop5:13764
19 Jan −10 days Ticket merged ndnop3:10527, ndnop5:13764
19 Jan −9 days Ticket filed noether:443
20 Jan −9 days Ticket merged noether:443
21 Jan −8 days Ticket filed Mosaddegh:41835,
MaBishomarim:49868
21 Jan −8 days Ticket merged Mosaddegh:41835,
MaBishomarim:49868
22 Jan −7 days Testing release 5.5 stable
24 Jan −5 days Testing release 6.0a1 alpha
27 Jan −2 days Public release 5.5 stable
27 Jan −2 days Public release 6.0a1 alpha
29 Jan 0 Blocked ndnop3:10527, ndnop5:13764,
noether:443, riemann:443,
MaBishomarim:49868, Mosaddegh:41835
Tor Browser 5.5.1/5.5.2/6.0a2: 2 new bridges
24 Jan −29 days Ticket filed JonbesheSabz:80, Azadi:443
28 Jan −26 days Ticket merged JonbesheSabz:80, Azadi:443
03 Feb −20 days Testing release 5.5.1 stable
05 Feb −18 days Public release 5.5.1 stable
12 Feb −11 days Public release 5.5.2 stable
15 Feb −8 days Public release 6.0a2 alpha
23 Feb 0 Blocked JonbesheSabz:80, Azadi:443
Tor Browser 5.5.3/6.0a3: no new bridges
Tor Browser 5.5.4/6.0a4: 4 new bridges
12 Mar −16 days Ticket filed Mosaddegh:80, Mosaddegh:443,
MaBishomarim:80, MaBishomarim:443
14 Mar −15 days Ticket merged Mosaddegh:80,
Mosaddegh:443, MaBishomarim:80,
MaBishomarim:443
18 Mar −10 days Public release 5.5.4 stable
18 Mar −10 days Public release 6.0a4 alpha
29 Mar 0 Blocked Mosaddegh:443, Mosaddegh:80,
MaBishomarim:443, MaBishomarim:80
Tor Browser 5.5.5/6.0a5/6.0: 3 new bridges
05 Apr −56 days Ticket filed GreenBelt:60873, GreenBelt:443,
GreenBelt:80
07 Apr −55 days Ticket merged GreenBelt:60873,
GreenBelt:80, GreenBelt:443
22 Apr −39 days Testing release 5.5.5 stable
24 Apr −37 days Testing release 6.0a5 alpha
26 Apr −35 days Public release 5.5.5 stable
28 Apr −33 days Public release 6.0a5 alpha
26 May −6 days Testing release 6.0 stable
30 May −1 day Public release 6.0 stable
01 Jun 0 Blocked GreenBelt:60873, GreenBelt:443,
GreenBelt:80
Tor Browser 6.0.1/6.0.2/6.0.3/6.0.4/6.5a1/6.5a2: no new
bridges
Tor Browser 6.0.5/6.5a3: 6 new bridges
?? ?? Blocked LeifEricson:50000
06 Sep −15 days Ticket filed LeifEricson:50000,
GreenBelt:5881, Mosaddegh:2934,
MaBishomarim:2413, JonbesheSabz:1894,
Azadi:4319
07 Sep −14 days Ticket merged LeifEricson:50000,
GreenBelt:5881, Mosaddegh:2934,
MaBishomarim:2413, JonbesheSabz:1894,
Azadi:4319
09 Sep −13 days Testing release 6.0.5 stable
16 Sep −6 days Public release 6.0.5 stable
20 Sep −1 day Public release 6.5a3 alpha
22 Sep 0 Blocked Mosaddegh:2934,
MaBishomarim:2413, JonbesheSabz:1894
20 Oct +28 days Blocked GreenBelt:5881
06 Nov +46 days Blocked Azadi:4319
Tor Browser 6.0.6/6.5a4: 8 new bridges
?? ?? Blocked LeifEricson:50001
21 Sep −28 days Ticket filed Lisbeth:443, // NX01:443
27 Sep −22 days Ticket merged Lisbeth:443, // NX01:443
05 Oct −14 days Ticket filed LeifEricson:50001,
GreenBelt:7013, Mosaddegh:9332,
MaBishomarim:7920, JonbesheSabz:4148,
Azadi:6041
06 Oct −13 days Ticket merged LeifEricson:50001,
GreenBelt:7013, Mosaddegh:9332,
MaBishomarim:7920, JonbesheSabz:4148,
Azadi:6041
19 Oct 0 Blocked MaBishomarim:7920, Lisbeth:443,
JonbesheSabz:4148
20 Oct +1 day Blocked GreenBelt:7013, Azadi:6041,
Mosaddegh:9332
10 Nov +22 days Testing release 6.0.6 stable
12 Nov +24 days Testing release 6.5a4 alpha
15 Nov +27 days Public release 6.0.6 stable
16 Nov +28 days Public release 6.5a4 alpha
04 Dec +46 days Blocked // NX01:443
Tor Browser 6.0.7/6.5a5: no new bridges
Tor Browser 6.0.8/6.5a6: 7 new bridges
?? ?? Blocked LeifEricson:50002
19 Oct 0 Blocked MaBishomarim:16488,
JonbesheSabz:4304
20 Oct +1 day Blocked GreenBelt:12166
27 Oct +8 days Blocked Mosaddegh:15937
06 Nov +18 days Blocked Azadi:16815
30 Nov +42 days Ticket filed NX01:443, LeifEricson:50002,
GreenBelt:12166, Mosaddegh:15937,
MaBishomarim:16488, JonbesheSabz:4304,
Azadi:16815
02 Dec +44 days Ticket merged NX01:443
04 Dec +46 days Blocked NX01:443
08 Dec +50 days Ticket merged LeifEricson:50002,
GreenBelt:12166, Mosaddegh:15937,
MaBishomarim:16488, JonbesheSabz:4304,
Azadi:16815
10 Dec +52 days Testing release 6.0.8 stable
13 Dec +55 days Public release 6.0.8 stable
13 Dec +55 days Public release 6.5a6 alpha
Table 2: Blocking of bridges in the “China 1” data set. Releases are batched according to the fresh bridges they
contain. Time offsets are relative to the “0” date of first blocking within each batch. The notation “// NX01:443”
indicates a commented-out bridge. Before the release batch 6.0.6/6.5a4, bridges are blocked only after a release; after
that they are blocked preemptively. Notice the concurrent blocking dates in the 6.0.6/6.5a4 and 6.0.8/6.5a6 batches.
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LeifEricson : 41213→50000→50001→50002
GreenBelt : 60873→ 5881→ 7013→12166
Mosaddegh : 41835→ 2934→ 9332→15937
MaBishomarim : 49868→ 2413→ 7920→16488
JonbesheSabz : 1894→ 4148→ 4304
Azadi : 4319→ 6041→16815
Table 3: Rotation of port numbers in successive releases.
The strategy worked until the second-to-last time, when
the GFW began blocking entire IP addresses. The ports
in the final rotation were blocked even before they were
used.
even as other ports on the same IP address were blocked.
(See riemann in Figure 2 for an example: its port 22 re-
mained accessible when its port 443 was blocked in Jan-
uary 2016.) Per-port blocking is what enabled us to run
multiple bridges on the same IP address.
In the last two batches, we noticed that the GFW
seems to have altered their blocking methods. New
bridges in these two batches were all blocked even be-
fore the public release. They were blocked soon after
they were merged into the public Git repository.
During this period, we observed that China also started
blocking on whole IP address, as well as continuing
blocking on IP address and port pairs. Unlike blocking
bridges, block for whole IP addresses did not seem to be
done all at once. By the end of December 2016, all our
bridges were blocked on the whole IP. Running any more
bridges on existing IPs is no longer possible.
As for Orbot bridges, we found that China did not
try to block them at all. They remained accessible until
late October and early November in 2016. At this point,
China started blocking whole IP address of bridges in Tor
Browser. Since these Orbot bridges only used different
ports on the same IPs, they were blocked as a side affect.
5.1 Port Rotations
In our first few batches, we found that China blocked on
IP and port pairs. This means that when we have an ex-
isting bridge that is blocked, if we just open up a new
port on the same IP, the new port would still be reach-
able. This is an easy way of evading GFW blocks com-
pared to setting up new bridges. We call this process
port rotation. We were interested in seeing whether or
not rotating the ports would give us new results. In re-
lease batches 6.0.5/6.5a3, 6.0.6/6.5a4, and 6.0.8/6.5a6,
we changed the port number of certain existing bridges
with each new batch, creating what appeared to the GFW
to be a large set of new bridges each time. Table 3 dis-
plays the ports that we rotated to.
The first rotation was successful. The new ports served
Bridge Status
LeifEricson:50000 Blocked
GreenBelt:5881 Unblocked∗
Mosaddegh:2934 Blocked
MaBishomarim:2413 Blocked
JonbesheSabz:1894 Blocked
Azadi:4319 Unblocked
Table 4: Blockage status in the days following the
6.0.5/6.5a3 releases. LeifEricson had been blocked since
we started measuring it. GreenBelt had an outage on all
ports during the time of blocking, which may have pro-
tected it when the other bridges were blocked. It was not
blocked when it recovered from its outage. and was also
unblocked once it recovered from its outage. Azadi:4319
somehow eluded discovery when the other bridges were
blocked, and remained unblocked for a while even after
Azadi:6041 was blocked in the following release.
as new unblocked bridges, and worked for a time af-
ter release before being blocked, as before. The second
rotation was initially successful, but this time when the
bridges were blocked, all ports on the IP address were
blocked, including the ports we had reserved for the third
rotation. The status of the bridges after release 6.0.5 is
shown in Table 4.
5.2 Failure to Block All New Bridges in a
Single Release
In batch 6.0.5/6.5a3, we rotated six ports, one (LeifEr-
icson) was preemptively blocked on all ports, three were
blocked on the same day, and two (GreenBelt and Azadi)
were not blocked. This is the first time we have seen this
phenomenon over the past year of observation. One of
the unblocked one (GreenBelt) was not operational at the
time, but did come back online later. We will now look
at each of these two bridges in detail.
5.2.1 GreenBelt
Our data shows that the U.S. probe site was not able
to connect to GreenBelt for an extended period of time,
namely from September 17, 2016 to September 24, 2016.
After inquiring with the bridge operator, we found that
GreenBelt was indeed down during this time due to an IP
table configuration error. The bridge rejected any incom-
ing traffic. The blocking of bridges for this release hap-
pened on September 22, 2016, which means that Green-
Belt was not functioning when the blocking happened.
This is a strong indicator that the censor used network
analysis techniques rather than parsing the bridge con-
figuration file directly.
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5.2.2 Azadi
Both our observation data and the bridge operator con-
firmed that Azadi had been working properly, unlike
GreenBelt. Combined with the fact that this is the only
time it happened during our observation, it shows that
the censor’s method for finding new bridges would have
a low probability of missing new bridges. This confirms
our previous suspicion that the censor is not parsing the
bridge configuration file.
5.2.3 Analysis
Our speculation for this anomaly is that the censor used
black-box network traffic analysis to find new bridges. In
other words, they ran the released version of Tor and sim-
ply monitored what addresses the executable connected
to. Since GreenBelt was down, this method would have
missed it. GreenBelt being down at the time could pro-
vide a reason for it not getting blocked, were it not for the
fact that Azadi did not have an outage and it also did not
get blocked. Tor Browser at that point had a very large
number of default bridges included. If the censor did not
monitor the executable long enough, this type of traffic
analysis might miss some new bridges. We believe this
is what happened to Azadi.
5.3 Preemptive Blocking
During our studies, it appears as though there was a
change in the GFW’s method of bridge discovery in Oc-
tober 2016. Rather than wait until after a release to
block bridges, it started blocking them after a ticket was
merged (before release). In release 6.0.6/6.5a4, we can
see in Table 2 that all the new bridges were blocked be-
fore the release. This behavior is drastically different
from what we have seen before. Assuming that the cen-
sor has not infiltrated the private mailing list, Tor bridges
appear in two places before a release. When requesting
to add new bridges, a ticket has to be submitted to the Tor
bug tracker. When this ticket is accepted, it is merged
and the new bridges would be added to the source code.
Both the Tor bug tracker and the source code repository
are publicly accessible, so a censor could learn the new
bridges from either of these two places. We noted though
that learning new bridges from the tickets would require
human inspection, since the tickets do not have specific
formats and can be on any issue. On the other hand,
a script can easily keep track of new bridges from the
source code repository. It would be easier for them to
read from the source code repository.
Bridge Time Day Date
GreenBelt 14:00 Thurs 20 Oct 2016
Mosaddegh 19:40 Thurs 27 Oct 2016
MaBishomarim 20:20 Wed 19 Oct 2016
JonbesheSabz 02:00 Thurs 20 Oct 2016
Azadi 05:50 Mon 07 Nov 2016
Table 5: IP Blocking Time in CST time. Since there are
interweaving unblocking after the initial IP block, we are
only looking at the initial block time here.
5.4 Batch Blocking Timing patterns
From Table 6, we can see that for our eight releases, the
batch blocking all happened on weekdays. Most of the
blocking happened on Tuesday and Thursday. Only one
blocking happened on Wednesday, and one on Friday.
Furthermore, they all happened between 10:00 and 17:00
local time. There seem to be no noticeable patterns to
these time. However, they all lie within working hours
in China. This seems to indicate some manual effort is
needed to make blocking take affect. The idea of manual
effort is further supported by the delay we see in blocking
for the first six batches. If the blocking is done purely
automatically, we would not expect to see a varying of
delay between the release and blocking.
One other thing to note is that starting from version
6.0.6/6.5a4, bridges were blocked before a release. It
suggests that the blocking process might have changed
as well, and the process might be automatic now.
When the GFW blocks whole IP addresses, they seem
to have a different timing pattern than the batch blocking
of bridges. This will be discussed in more detail in 5.5.
5.5 IP Blocks
In the first six release batches, we confirmed a finding of
Winter and Lindskog [25] that the Great Firewall blocks
bridges by their specific port number. A bridge that is
discovered and blocked on one port will not cause other
ports on the IP address to get blocked. This property of
the firewall allowed us to rotate ports and, for example,
take the MaBishomarim bridge through ports 49868, 80,
2413, in successive releases.
Since October 2016 and the 6.0.6/6.5a4 release batch,
bridges have been blocked on the entire IP. On Octo-
ber 20, two bridges were blocked together on the en-
tire IP address. However, we still could not account
for the blocking of Mosaddegh and Azadi, which hap-
pened on a seemingly unrelated date. Blocks affected
even ports not-yet-used ports that were waiting in reserve
for the following release, and non-bridge ports such as
22. The all-ports blocking affected even one of the earli-
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est bridges we had measured, riemann, whose obfs4 port
was blocked in January 2016 and its SSH port 10 months
later (see Figure 2).
Between November 15 and November 21, 2016, Jon-
besheSabz and Lisbeth were reachable from one site in
the “China 1” AS, but not the other.
As mentioned in section 5.4, all simultaneous blocking
for bridges happened during working hours on a week-
day. This suggested manual blocking instead of an auto-
matic blocking system. One key observation we have is
that blocking for IP occurred at times such as 2:00AM
and 5:50AM China Standard Time, likely falling out-
side the range of the standard workday. This allows us
to reach a few possible scenarios:
1. The limitation to working hours is just a coinci-
dence, an artifact of the small size of the blocking
event data set.
2. Individual port blocking uses a different system
than IP:port blocking. Even though IP:port block-
ing is manual, IP address blocking is automatic.
Another observation is that there is a pattern of in-
terweaving unblocking and blocking after an IP block.
Although Mosaddegh was already blocked on October
27, it later became available again for a period of time
whereas previously blocked individual ports remained
blocked. It is only after November 15 that it became per-
manently blocked. We observe this pattern across all the
blocked bridges. Also, we notice that even when the IP
address was unblocked, ports that are previously blocked
would still stay blocked. In the example above, we can
see that port 9332 and 2934 for Mosaddegh were never
unblocked even though the IP itself was unblocked mul-
tiple times. This seems to indicate a two-tier structure to
the GFW. The IP:port blocking and the IP blocking are
handled separately. If an IP:port pair is in either of these,
it would get blocked.
One possible hypothesis is that this is an artifact re-
sulted from GFW could not handle so much traffic. The
interweaving unblocking and blocking could simply re-
sult from GFW failing under too much traffic. Currently
we don’t really know whether our hypothesis is correct,
but this would be part of our intended future work.
5.6 Bridge List File
The bridge list file is a configuration file with all the
bridges written on it. Reading this file seems to be the
easiest way for censors to discover new bridges.
In Section 5.2, we present evidence supporting that the
GFW was not reading the bridge list file at that time. It
seems that it used black-box network analysis to find the
bridges instead.
batch day date time ± range
5.0.5/5.0.6/5.5a5 Tue 22 Dec 09:00 UTC / 17:00 CST
5.5/6.0a1 Fri 29 Jan 06:03 UTC / 14:03 CST ±137s
5.5.1/5.5.2/6.0a2 Tue 23 Feb 02:47 UTC / 10:47 CST ±1s
5.5.4/6.0a4 Tue 29 Mar 06:04 UTC / 14:04 CST ±16s
5.5.5/6.0a5/6.0 Wed 01 Jun 02:46 UTC / 10:46 CST ±15s
6.0.5/6.5a3∗ Thu 22 Sep 06:41 UTC / 14:41 CST ±63s
6.0.6/6.5a4 various
6.0.8/6.5a6 various
Table 6: Common blocking times of bridges in a release
batch. Before October 2016, all bridges within a batch
were blocked within a few minutes of each other. (The
only exception is the 6.0.5/6.5a3 batch, marked with an
‘∗’, in which LeifEricson:50000 had been blocked since
the beginning, GreenBelt:5881 was offline during the
time of the block, and Azadi:4319 avoided notice.) After
that, an evident change in tactics caused there to be no
common date of blocking. A shift to blocking by IP ad-
dress meant that some bridges were blocked even before
having a ticket filed.
However, there has been recent evidence to suggest
that China operators have changed their behavior and are
now reading the this file either instead of or in addition to
black-box testing. It appears as though they began look-
ing at the bridge configuration file between the release of
6.0.5/6.5a3 and the blocking of Azadi:6041.
By looking at Table 7, we know they were not look-
ing at the bridge list file before the release of 6.0.5/6.5a3
because some of the bridges in 6.0.5/6.5a3 did not get
blocked (including Azadi:4319). We already discussed
this in section 5.2.
Starting from Tor 6.0.6/6.5a4, the censors started pre-
emptively blocking bridges. Azadi:6041 was released
in version 6.0.6/6.5a4. However, it got blocked af-
ter its ticket was merged and before the release came
out. Furthermore, the same ticket that added Azadi:6041
also removed Azadi:4319 from the configuration file.
Azadi:4319 was one of the bridges that did not get
blocked in 6.0.5/6.5a3. When Azadi:6041 was blocked,
Azadi:4319 remained unblocked. Even after 6.0.6/6.5a4
is released, Azadi:4319 was not blocked until after Azadi
was blocked on the whole IP address, on November 7,
2016. The likely explanation is that they looked at the
ticket or the Git repository for Tor. Either way, this
means that they were looking at the bridge list file to
block new bridges.
Therefore, we conclude that censors must have started
looking at the bridge list file sometime between those
two events. This is a change from past behaviors and
appears to be a new action taken by China.
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Event Date
Azadi:4319 opens Aug 30
6.0.5 public release (contains Azadi:4319) Sep 16
Rotate Azadi:4319→Azadi:6041 Oct 05
Azadi:6041 blocked Oct 20
6.0.6 public release (contains Azadi:6041) Nov 15
Table 7: Azadi timeline
5.7 Commented Bridges
From Section 5.6 we know that the censors changed their
behavior and started reading the bridge list file to find
new bridges. We wanted to know whether this process is
automatic or manual.
We hypothesized the following:
• Censors parse the bridge list file automatically.
• A person manually reads the bridge list file.
In the 6.0.6/6.5a4 release batch, we incorporated
two new bridges at the same time: Lisbeth:443 and
NX01:443. We left NX01 commented out and added Lis-
beth in as normal, as seen below.
pref(..., "obfs4 192.95.36.142:443 ...");
// Not used yet
// pref(..., "obfs4 85.17.30.79:443 ...");
We discovered that of the two, only Lisbeth was
blocked while NX01 remained unblocked for a period of
time. NX01 was later blocked after it was uncommented.
Our reasoning is that this would help us distinguish
between human inspection and automatic blocking. If
humans are processing the source code manually, they
are likely to block NX01 and Lisbeth together. If the
blocking process is automatic, then NX01 would be left
unblocked.
Since only the uncommented bridge Lisbeth was
blocked initially, this suggests an automatic parser rather
than a manual parser. We believe that had a person been
manually viewing the file, they would have also blocked
NX01 since they would have seen that it was in the file.
5.8 Other Anomalies
There is a conspicuous on–off pattern in the reach-
ability of certain bridges from China, for example
ndnop3:24215 between January 15 and May 10, 2016.
The pattern is roughly periodic with a period of 24 hours.
Figure 3 averages many 24-hour periods to show the
reachability against time of day of two bridges. The pres-
ence of the diurnal pattern appears to depend on both the
bridge and the probing site, perhaps depending on the
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Figure 3: Rates of reachability by time of day for
two bridges from two sites, between February 1 and
March 15, 2016. There is a diurnal blocking pattern
in both China sites, though not the same bridges are
affected at both sites. China Standard Time (CST) is
UTC+08:00.
network path, as the same bridges do not show the pattern
at both sites. The pattern can come and go, for example
in riemann:443 before and after April 1, 2016.
The China sites also display what are apparently tem-
porary failures of censorship, stretches of a few hours
during which otherwise blocked bridges were reachable.
Intriguingly, one of these corresponds to a known fail-
ure of the Great Firewall that was documented in the
press [11]. On March 27, Google services—usually
blocked in China—were reachable from about 15:30 to
17:15 UTC. This time period is a subset of one in which
our bridges were reachable, which went from about
10:00 to 18:00 UTC on that day.
5.9 Censorship Measurement Platforms
The Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI)
is a project that detects censorship around the globe. We
contacted the the OONI team and they agreed to help us
with our experiment. This afforded us more than 100
observation sites in different countries that measured Tor
bridge connectivity. This measurement started in early
December 2016 and we currently have measurement data
for approximately three months.
One really interesting observation we have is that the
firewalls of several countries might be faking connection
responses. These countries includes Thailand, Indone-
sia, Netherlands and Bulgaria. This behavior is espe-
cially obvious in the probe data for the bridge fdctor-
bridge01:80. The bridge fdctorbridge01:80, at that time,
was defunct, having closed down in May 2016 [6]. Nat-
urally we should get a connection error (timeout) when
we try to probe it. However, measurements in these few
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countries showed that the connection to port 80 at this
bridge was successful.
Since we only had very few probe locations in Thai-
land, Indonesia, Netherlands, it might be just a local
HTTP proxy problem for our probe sites. However, there
are three probe sites in different ASes in Bulgaria, and
we noticed that this problem exists in all three probe lo-
cations. This seems to indicate this isn’t just a local prob-
lem for a specific network. We decided to dig further into
Bulgaria by bringing in a VPN, and attempting to make
TCP connections to fdctorbridge01. We were not able
to reproduce the results on OONI report, however, since
all of our connections timed out, which is the expected
behavior.
We also noticed that for the probe sites in Bulgaria
(AS 44901), connections to port 80 and 443 for certain IP
addresses have an extremely short response time, while
connections to other ports takes much longer. For exam-
ple, we saw that connections to port 80 and 443 for Ma-
Bishomarim only takes around one millisecond. Connec-
tions to other ports take around 500 milliseconds instead.
This substantial difference makes us wonder whether a
HTTP spoofing is taking place.
5.10 Retrospective Analysis
There is a gap in our measurement data from China
during August 2016. In order to see the bigger picture
and capture a larger timeframe, it is preferable that we
can look at logs of data even before December 2015.
CollecTor [18] is a public Tor data collection service.
It collects network status of Tor across the entire net-
work. It records the amount of daily traffic of each
bridge. More precisely, it records the number of daily
connections each bridge is receiving from each country.
We believe that by looking at the number of daily con-
nections from China, we can estimate whether a bridge
was blocked. Since it is known that China does not have
the same blocking rules across different areas [8], this
data would contain a substantial amount of noise. Fur-
thermore, not all bridges have data for every single day.
Blocking inference from this would be a rough estimate
at best, but we still think that it would be useful to see
the whole picture.
We used China’s daily traffic data from CollecTor to
infer the reachability of different bridges. This can be
supplementary to our own measurements. CollecTor can
be used to infer historical data that we were not able to
see directly. The logic behind this is that when a bridge
is no longer reachable from China, there would be a large
drop in its daily traffic from China. Due to the fact that
China has different blocking rules in different regions,
the amount of traffic might never reach zero. However,
we still think that the drop in traffic should be large
enough for us to distinguish between when the bridge
is blocked from China and when it is not.
From Figure 2, we can see CollecTor data and our own
measurement for LeifEricson. There is a clear match be-
tween the two. When our measurement shows that the
bridge is reachable, there would be a spike in the traffic
data. Looking at the CollecTor data, we see that the last
time LeifEricson was reachable from China was around
July 2016. We know that LeifEricson was blocked on the
whole IP even before our monitoring started in Septem-
ber, but were unable to observe the time. Looking at
the CollecTor traffic data, we suspect the IP block may
have started much earlier than we expected, potentially
as early as July 2016.
Traffic data for MaBishomarim demonstrates the rare
case that the traffic data does not match our observa-
tion. From September to October 2016, they still match
well, but since November 2016, they became contradic-
tory. Our own measurement shows that MaBishomarim
has not been reachable since November 2016, but Col-
lecTor shows that MaBishomarim received a large burst
of traffic in mid-November 2016. We speculate that this
incongruity is the artifact of the different blocking rules
in different regions of China. While the region our mea-
surement site is in blocked MaBishomarim, a different
region still had MaBishomarim unblocked.
6 Limitations
In our tests, we assume that a bridge is unblocked if we
are able to make a TCP connection. It may be the case,
however, that a censor effectively blocks a bridge despite
allowing TCP connections. The fact that one can connect
to a bridge does not always mean that the censor will al-
low a sustained obfs4 connection. We know of exactly
such a case in Kazakhstan where TCP reachability tests
underestimate the level of censorship. The firewall in
Kazakhstan blocks Tor Browser’s default obfs4 bridges,
but differently from the GFW: it stops transferring pack-
ets only some time after a connection is established [9].
We rented a VPN with an endpoint in Kazakhstan
(AS 203087) and ran tests from December 18, 2016
to February 4, 2017. There is a risk that the censor-
ship seen by a VPN censorship may not be representa-
tive of censorship elsewhere in a country; we have not
been able to eliminate that possibility but we verified
that the VPN saw censorship of at least some domains
like tumblr.com. We ran our usual active probing ex-
periments of all bridges every 20 minutes, as well as
hourly attempts to establish a Tor connection to a selec-
tion of public and non-public bridges. The results of TCP
reachability tests were uniform: all bridges were always
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Figure 4: The left graph is the daily traffic data for LeifEricson. The right one is for MaBishomarim. The blue line
is the number of daily connections from China. The red bar is the actual connectivity data we measured. The long
sloped section from September to October for the traffic data in LeifEricson is an artifact of missing data. This is no
measurement data from CollecTor available for that time and the line graph just connected the two nearest data points.
reachable. The results of the Tor bootstrap tests told a
different and ambiguous story. Tor measures its boot-
strapping progress as a fraction between 0 and 100%.
Some bridges, like Lisbeth:443 and Mosaddegh:9332,
were essentially always able to reach 100%. Others, like
Mosaddegh:80, GreenBelt:80, and GreenBelt:5881, al-
ways stalled at 10% (indicating a failure after the initial
TLS handshake). Yet others, like Mosaddegh:443 and
Mosaddegh:1984, reached 25%, showing that at least
some Tor protocol data flowed through the obfs4 chan-
nel, but not enough to establish a full Tor circuit.
7 Implications for Circumvention
There are a number of implications of our findings for the
practice of censorship circumvention. One is that even
naive approaches like Tor Browser’s default bridges are
effective against many censors.
Another implication comes from observation of how
the Great Firewall discovers and blocks default bridges.
Whether it is done through black-box testing, or inspec-
tion of source code, there are ways around, involving
complications on the client side. For example, rather
than strictly obeying the static list of bridge addresses
built in, the client software could deterministically com-
pute some function of the bridge list, perhaps varying
over time, whose output is the real set of addresses to use.
Suppose the bridge addresses automatically changed ev-
ery day: a censor doing a black-box test would also
have to test every day, else it would miss the new set of
bridges. Or suppose the censor parses a file containing
a list of bridges: a countermeasure is to tweak addresses
so that they do not accurately reflect the addresses the
client goes to; adding 1 to each octet of the IP address,
for example. That would succeed until the censor devotes
energy to reverse engineer the tweaking algorithm.
Of course these simple, incremental countermeasures
are essentially security through obscurity, only perpet-
uating the lamented cat-and-mouse game of censorship
and circumvention. Is it even worth pursuing such strate-
gies, rather than looking at new circumvention tech-
niques that are hard for a censor to block in principle?
One answer is that yes, as long as censors remain rel-
atively slow and stupid, and a little bit of investment of
effort brings a large amount of effective circumvention, it
is worth keeping at least a little bit ahead of the censors,
even if it means tweaking conceptually broken systems.
Of course, we should set our sights farther, and not allow
such pursuits to fully distract us from working on funda-
mental advances. Ultimately, it may be worth it to play
the cat-and-mouse game because by doing so and paying
careful attention, we learn surprising facts about censors
and their operation, revealing weaknesses that can help
the development of future systems.
8 Ethics and Safety
There are risks involved in running Tor experiments.
Some risks include disrupting other measurements, dis-
closing bridge locations, and endangering the bridge op-
erators. During our experiment, we consulted with the
Tor Research Safety Board [23], which helps researchers
conduct experiments safely. The research summary we
sent to the board is included in Appendix A.
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A Tor Research Safety Board
This appendix contains a copy of the research summary
we sent to the Tor Research Safety Board [23], a group of
researchers who provide recommendations on conduct-
ing research on Tor in a safe way. It is included here
with no changes except for formatting.
We’re seeking comments on a continuation of our re-
search on the blocking of default Tor Browser bridges.
What we’ve done so far on this subject is covered in our
FOCI 2016 paper, “Censors’ Delay in Blocking Circum-
vention Proxies”: https://www.bamsoftware.com/proxy-
probe/
The short summary of what we want to do is to greatly
expand our measurement locations, by using existing
platforms such as ICLab, OONI, or RIPE Atlas. We want
to start doing traceroutes in addition to TCP reachability.
We want to control how new bridges are introduced, in
order to test specific hypotheses, such as whether there is
a difference in detection between stable and alpha.
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1. What are you trying to learn, and why is that useful
for the world? That is, what are the hoped-for benefits of
your experiment?
1. Where the default bridges are blocked, globally. We
know that China (eventually) blocks them, and Iran
(currently) does not; but we don’t know the situa-
tion anywhere else.
2. In places where the default bridges get blocked, the
dynamics of blocking, such as how long it takes, its
granularity (IP only or IP/port), and whether blocks
are eventually removed.
3. How bridge addresses are discovered (e.g. through
traffic analysis, tickets, or source code), and how
they are extracted (e.g. manually or through auto-
mated parsing).
The overarching, abstract benefit of the experiment is
a better understanding of censorship, leading to the de-
velopment of better informed circumvention.
The latest bridge users’ guide (https://blog.torproject.
org/blog/breaking-through-censorship-barriers-even-
when-tor-blocked) recommends using meek to users in
China, because obfs4 is blocked. This research would let
us know whether to expand that advice beyond China.
By comparing reachability timelines across many cen-
sors, we may find evidence for or against censors shar-
ing a common data source. For example, if two countries
block a set of bridges at the same moment, it is probably
because there is something in common in their detection.
We may uncover specific operational weaknesses of
censors that can be exploited. To choose an invented but
plausible scenario, maybe a censor only does black-box
testing of new bundles on the day of release: in that case,
the browser could avoid connecting to a subset of bridges
until after a certain date.
If we are able to reachability publish data online on a
frequently updated basis, someone could use it to build
a Weather-like service that notifies operators of default
bridges when their bridge stops running. This happened
a few times already: some of the default bridges stopped
running because of lost iptables rules after a reboot, and
we were the first to notice, only because we were looking
at the graphs every once in a while. (This would not
always be possible using only Collector data, because for
example the bridge might be running, but its obfs4 port
closed because of a firewall misconfiguration.)
2. What exactly is your plan? That is, what are the steps
of your experiment, what will you collect, how will you
keep it safe, and soon.
So far, we have only run from a handful of VPSes,
never more than 4 at a time. We only had visibility into
the U.S., China, and Iran. We carefully watched for the
introduction of new obfs4 bridges (in some cases be-
ing privately informed in advance), and added them to a
probe list, which got probed every 20 minutes by a cron
job on the VPSes.
We want to greatly expand our probe sites, by using
existing measurement platforms such as ICLab, OONI,
or RIPE Atlas. We hope to be able to measure from
dozens or hundreds of diverse locations. We have al-
ready talked to ICLab and they are willing to probe our
destinations from their endpoints, which mostly consist
of commercial VPNs in various countries. The probes
will consist of periodic TCP connections to Tor Browser
default obfs4 bridges (released and not-yet-released) and
control destinations. We want to start doing traceroutes
as well.
We expect that the TCP reachability data we collect
will be similar to what we have collected so far. It looks
like this:
date,site,host,port,elapsed,success,errno,errmsg
1449892115.2,bauxite,178.209.52.110,443,10.0101830959,False,None,timed out
1449901202.36,eecs-login,192.30.252.130,443,0.0761489868164,True,,
1450858800.18,eecs-login,109.105.109.165,24215,0.189998865128,False,146,[Errno 146] Connection refused
For traceroutes we will collect hop information (per-
haps with some hops obscured; see the risks in the next
section). We expect to be able to publish everything we
collect in an immediate and ongoing basis.
We also want to test some specific hypotheses by con-
trolling the circumstances of bridge release. Here are
specific experiments we have thought of (see correspond-
ing risks in the next section):
a. Rotating bridge ports with every release. Since
the GFW blocks based on IP/port, we can try just
changing the port number of each bridge in every
release (using iptables forwarding for example).
b. Putting different subsets of bridges in stable and al-
pha releases. We saw that Orbot-only bridges did
not get blocked; we wonder if stable-only or alpha-
only bridges also will not get blocked.
c. Leaving a bridge commented out in bridge prefs.js.
This may help us distinguish between black-box
testing and manual source code review.
3. What attacks or risks might be introduced or assisted
because of your actions or your data sets, and how well
do you resolve each of them?
The main risk is potentially enabling censors to dis-
cover new bridge addresses early, by monitoring our
probe sites. Even though “default bridges” are concep-
tually broken, they do in fact work for many people, and
we wouldn’t want to reduce their utility.
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In our research so far, we’ve identified a number of
ways that censors can discover new bridges: by watch-
ing the bug tracker, by reading source code, or by in-
specting releases. Whenever possible, we want to start
monitoring new bridges even before they enter the bug
tracker. If a censor discovers one of our probe sites
(which would not be hard to do), then they could watch
for new addresses being connected to and add them to
a blocklist. An adversary keeping netflow records could
identify probe sites retroactively: download Tor Browser
and get the new bridges, then find the clients that made
the earliest connections to those addresses.
We mitigate this risk partially by only testing default
bridges, not secret BridgeDB bridges. That way, even if
a censor discovers them, it doesn’t affect users of secret
bridges. Also, we suspect that, because default bridges
are, in theory, easily discoverable, adding another poten-
tial discovery mechanism of medium difficult does not
greatly increase the risk of their being blocked.
If early blocking of bridges as a result of our experi-
ment becomes a problem, we can adjust the protocol, for
example not to monitor bridges in advance of their ticket
being filed.
Our heretofore published data do not include the IP ad-
dresses of the probe locations. The people who supplied
us with the probe locations asked us not to reveal them.
Traceroute will make it harder to conceal the source of
probes in our published data. We can, for example, omit
the first few hops in each trace, but we don’t know the
best practices along these lines. The potential harm to
probe site operators is probably less when we use exist-
ing measurement platforms rather than VPSes acquired
through personal contacts.
Our results may be contaminated by other experiments
being run from the same source address. The measure-
ment platforms we propose to use already are running
various other experiments, so they may be treated differ-
ently by firewalls. The most likely wrong outcome is that
we falsely detect a bridge being blocked, when it is re-
ally the client address being blocked (because it is a VPN
node, for example). The risk goes in the other direction
as well: our experiment might affect others running on
the same endpoint.
Here are the risks related to testing the specific bridge-
blocking hypotheses enumerated in the previous section:
a. The risk in rotating bridge ports is that eventually
the censor catches on to the pattern and develops
more sophisticated, automated blocking. If the cen-
sor doesn’t react, it means we have better reacha-
bility; but if it does, we lose what small window of
post-release reachability we have.
b. The risk in segregating bridge addresses across sta-
ble and alpha is that a network observer can tell
which a user is running by observing what addresses
they connect to. This may, for example, enable them
to target an exploit that only works on a specific ver-
sion.
c. The risk in playing games like commenting out
bridge lines is slight: a commented-out bridge may
get blocked even before it has had any real users.
4. Walk us through why the benefits from item 1 outweigh
the remaining risks from item 3: why is this plan worth-
while despite the remaining risks?
The main risk, bridge discovery by censors, has low
potential harm, and can be mitigated if necessary by
changing when we start monitoring bridges, or even
ceasing the experiment altogether. The risk of our mea-
surements is probably less than that of even having de-
fault bridges in the first place, because our probes are not
connected to any real-world circumventor.
The risks associated with our specific bridge-blocking
hypotheses are variable, and we would appreciate dis-
cussion on them. The one we planned to try first is the
commenting-out one, because it seems to have the best
risk/reward tradeoff.
Incidentally, OONI already has a bridge reachability
nettest that is similar to what we have pro-
posed: https://ooni.torproject.org/nettest/tor-bridge-
reachability/ However their bridge list is not
up to date, https://gitweb.torproject.org/ooni-
probe.git/tree/var/example inputs/bridges.txt?id=v1.6.1
and a perusal of http://measurements.ooni.torproject.org/
shows that the test is not being run regularly.
B Code and Data
https://www.bamsoftware.com/proxy-probe/
16
